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Abstract 
This thesis adds to the literature on local welfare effects of resource extraction industries. I 
investigate how political participation rates and resource curse effects are influenced by the 
opening and closing of mines in SSA. Based on past research I hypothesize that increased 
employment and income leads to higher participation rates as a result of more lenient 
individual resource constraints. However, many SSA countries have a history of poor 
institutional quality, and when they discover natural resources; most of them are hit by what is 
commonly referred to as the resource curse. High levels of corruption, political intimidation 
and declining measures of free and fair elections are examples of this, and I also look into 
how these parameters are influenced by mining activity. By employing a difference in 
difference strategy on  Afrobarometer survey data and GPS-coordinates on future, present and 
past mines in SSA, my results show that demonstration activity is positively influenced whilst 
there’s no clear effect on voting. The resource curse effect variables on the other hand, seem 
to be strongly negatively influenced by mining activity. When examining how the resource 
curse effects influence participation rates I find that they have a negative effect on voting and 
a positive effect on demonstration. This result could also be driven by another third variable, 
such as inequality, which is again effected by mining activity and windfalls. The conclusion 
could consequently be that the variables related to the resource constraint theory are at best 
offset by resource curse effects. Any measures that have been taken to include the local 
population in the economic growth process spurred by resources have mostly failed. As a 
result, people are voicing their discontent in demonstrations rather than more traditional 
political channels such as voting, as this no longer has any real effect on political outcomes.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s an increasing number of African states have adopted 
democratic rule and electoral institutions. Although the consolidation process in most 
countries is still on-going, the last 20 years have entailed a major transfer of political power 
from elites to the masses. Even if this can be regarded as an immensely important transition in 
modern African history, most Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) still struggle with high 
levels of inequality and poverty in addition to rampant crime and corruption. This doesn’t 
only hurt the political stability and the legitimacy of the governments, but also profoundly 
impedes their economic growth (Van der Ploeg, 2011). 
 
However, the resource and commodity-boom that has developed in the aftermath of the 
entrance of major newly industrialised economies in the global market, with China in 
particular, has resulted in unprecedented economic growth for many of the resource-rich SSA 
countries. The demand for, and the prices of African resources have soared, effectively 
placing African governments in an entirely new position both economically and politically. 
The resource-boom consequently entails both huge possibilities and challenges for African 
countries.  With their enormous potential for development it is paramount that they manage 
their resources in such a way that they reap as many benefits from it as possible. In order to 
create broad economic growth in the SSA, these countries have to avoid a deepening of the 
problems with corrupt institutions and civil servants. The so-called resource curse must in 
other words be avoided. Rent-seeking, nepotism, inefficiency and vast levels of inequality 
must be fought if the SSA countries are to enter a positive cycle. (Mehlum et al, 2006; Van 
der Ploeg, 2011)         
 
One vital component is then to ensure that the windfalls and possible multiplier effects benefit 
local communities as well as the general population (Eggert, 2012; UNECA, 2010; Morris et 
al, 2011). However, it may seem that many of these countries are developing in the wrong 
direction. Over the past couple of years several African countries have received wide negative 
media attention as a result of strikes, demonstrations and civil unrest in mining communities 
across the continent. Citizens have stood up against low wages, corruption and violations of 
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safety and environmental laws. The clash between mining workers on strike and federal 
police in Marikana, South Africa amounted to the singular most tragic incident where 34 
people were killed and plenty more injured.   
 
These protests and demonstrations that have come in the wake of the resource boom shows 
that many ordinary people feel bypassed, and have not been given the opportunity to take part 
in their countries’ resource-led economic growth. For improving their opportunity to do so, 
scholars point out that governments need to start facilitating for local and national businesses 
to enter the value chain of the resource extraction process.  If the companies that manage the 
resources make use of locally produced products and services, country-wide economic growth 
can ensue. The effects of increased resource extraction can then potentially lead to higher 
employment rates and income in addition to increased capacity building and education levels. 
Resource abundance does consequently have the  potential to contribute to lower inequality 
rates and higher living standards, both for the locals as well as for the population as a whole 
(Morris et al., 2011; Wright and Czelusta, 2004; Eggert 2002)   
 
However, in order for these linkages and multipliers to take effect it is vital that politicians 
both on a national and local level take responsibility for ensuring that good policies are 
passed, that these are acted on and that they are monitored over time so that the poorer, less 
resourceful part of the population actually get their share. Previous research has shown how 
much the outcomes can vary depending on institutional quality and policy action (Eggert, 
2002; UNECA, 2010; Morris et al, 2011). 
   
In order for politicians to be held accountable for their actions the countries must have a 
functioning political system with citizens that participate. The notion that all votes and voices 
count equally is at the heart of the democratic ideal and it is therefore a huge problem that 
research shows that those with less income, education and employment vote and participate 
less than their more advantaged co-citizens (Bartels, 2005; Brady et al., 1995; Griffin and 
Newman, 2005; Isaksson, 2010; Verba et al., 1995). Furthermore, the preferences of people at 
the lower end of the income distribution in addition to those who don’t participate are largely 
ignored by their representatives, meaning that policies on the political agenda are skewed in 
favour of those who already have the most(Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2005; and Griffin and 
Newman, 2005). Consequently, both economic and political inequalities can potentially 
worsen as a result.  
  
This line of research focuses on how structural inequalities influence an individual’s resource 
constraint with respect to political participation. The more information, skill, time and money 
you have determines how much you participate and/or contribute. The determinants can 
consequently be individual with respect to income and education level or contextual with 
respect to the size and diversity of your social network (Brady et. al., 1995).   
 
One would perhaps think that this perspective on political participation would be especially 
relevant in an SSA context, as more people have less of both time and money. However, there 
is no apparent reason why the voting patterns in SSA should follow those found in the USA 
and Western Europe. In fact, the limited research that exists on this topic points out that this is 
not the case at all (Isaksson et al., 2014; Bratton, 2008; Bratton et al., 2010; Kuenzi and 
Lambright, 2010; Isaksson, 2010). Only education appears to have some positive effect, 
whilst with income and employment it rather seems the other way around. Given that there’s 
been so little research on political participation in the SSA, it is interesting to see what 
mechanisms can be at play at a more local level and what welfare effects local resource 
extraction could entail both in terms of increased employment and political participation. 
  
This thesis consequently seeks to investigate how local mining activity influences political 
participation rates. I also examine how resource curse measures evolve after mine opening 
and closing, and how these effect political activities. By applying a difference-in-difference 
strategy with Afrobarometer survey-data and GPS coordinates from the Raw Material 
Dataset, it will be possible to identify changes in participation behaviour as a result of the 
opening and closing of mines. The hypothesis is that mining activity leads to higher 
employment rates for the local population, which means that they will participate more as a 
result of less strict resource constraint conditions. However, the results suggest that resource 
curse effects also come into play with increased mining activity, effectively reversing much of 
the positive effect of better living conditions and larger networks.   
 
I find that mining activity has a positive effect on employment, but this doesn’t necessarily 
translate into higher political participation. The outcomes of the voting regressions give 
results that are hard to conclude upon whilst with demonstrations the results are 
predominantly positive. However, when using different variables as proxies for inter-election 
participation, the results from these are unclear.  This could indicate that the trends in more 
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traditional forms of political participation aren’t affected the same way as demonstrations. It 
appears that the resource curse effects, which all become stronger with mining activity, leads 
to less voting, and meeting attendance, and more demonstrations.  This indicates that it isn’t 
the increased employment rates or less binding resource constraints that lead to higher 
demonstration participation. These determinants generally seem to have a very small impact 
on participation rates. I rather interpret these results as a symptom of failing strategies for 
including the local population (if there exists any) in the economic beneficiation process. 
Consequently it may be the case that this has resulted in disillusioned democratic citizens that 
rather choose to voice their discontent through demonstrations and protests.      
  
The thesis will start by giving an overview of the literature at hand on the relevant topics 
before the data material is presented. The empirical strategy and method utilised will then be 
explained. The results and analysis will follow, before the results are discussed and concluded 
upon.   
 2 Theory 
 
 
 
Democracy and political participation  
In order for a democratic government to be legitimate and govern a country according to its 
ideals, political participation is paramount. Since democracy means “the rule of the people”, 
the people consequently have to express their opinions on matters as well as representatives 
for this definition to be valid (Bratton et al, 2005).  
 
However, it is widely acknowledged that the degree of political participation among citizens 
is not equally dispersed. Studies on western democracies suggest that an unrepresentative 
selection of people dominate the statistics and that this group disproportionally represent 
those who are better off in society  (Bartels, 2005; Brady et al, 2005; Griffin and Newman, 
2005; Isaksson, 2010). If it is then true that policy preferences vary across socio-economic 
groups and that representatives are more attentive towards those who participate, then there’s 
a risk that skewed political participation translates into skewed policies that favour those who 
participate (Bartels, 2005; Griffin and Newman, 2005; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).     
Political inequality 
Many years of research has shown that political participation tends to be unequally distributed 
among citizens (Bartels, 2005; Brady et al, 2005; Griffin and Newman, 2005; Isaksson, 2010). 
Poorer, less educated people vote and participate less and this results in a skewed mix of 
issues that are brought to the agenda. The more money and social capital you have, the more 
decisive is your vote and opinion (Bartels, 2005; Griffin and Newman, 2005; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980).  
 
Bartels (2005), Gilens (2005) and Griffin and Newman (2005) all investigate the 
responsiveness of American senators towards their constituents and finds that they vote a lot 
more in line with the opinions and interests of those with high income than those at the lower 
end of the scale. Bartels finds that American senators are about 50 % more responsive to those 
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who have an income within the top third percentile of the distribution, than to those in the 
middle third. The bottom third percentile has virtually no influence on the voting patterns of 
their senators at all. They all point to the fact that Americans with different income levels 
have very varying policy preferences, and that those who belong to the upper part of the 
distribution often have interests that are more in line with elites, pressure groups and senators 
themselves. This is therefore not necessarily a conscious action on the representative’s part.  
 
Griffin and Newman (2005) distinguish between voters and non-voters and point out that 
those who are richer, and have more social capital often participate more in other political 
activities in addition to voting. They are therefore much better at communicating their views 
on political matters. Those on the lower end of the income distribution then lose influence, 
and their preferences are overlooked, not only indirectly through that representatives don’t 
vote in line with their interests, but also directly through the fact that they generally engage 
less in politics than their richer fellow constituents thereby failing to communicate their 
preferences and needs. 
Determinants of political participation 
These findings fit well with previous studies that have stressed the role of structural 
inequalities in resource endowments when examining the determinants of political 
participation ( see for example Verba et. al, 1995; Brady et. al, 1995) . Because participation 
is costly with regards to time, money, knowledge and information, a person has to regard their 
political activity as worthwhile, meaning that the relative opportunity cost of participating 
must be within a certain limit.  
 
In addition to individual endowments, social networks and social capital are seen as an 
important source of motivation, information and knowledge. Through networks and those one 
meets on a regular basis, individuals learn not only about political issues, but also about the 
political process and how to participate in it.  
 
Early research by for example Verba and Nie (1972) and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) 
focus on socioeconomic status (SES). Examining income, education and social capital levels, 
they find that SES is a strong indicator of political participation.  
 
 Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) look beyond SES and develop a resource model which 
summarises most of the newer findings in the literature at hand.  The model takes time, 
money and civic skills such as communication and organisational capacities in to account. 
These resources are shown to be distributed unequally among different groups in society, and 
do not necessarily follow people’s SES. Time and some types of civic skills is typically a 
resource that people with lower SES have more of. They distinguish between various types of 
activities such as voting, making donations and contributing with time to political activities. 
One needs time to take part in political activity, money to make contributions, and have an 
interest in politics as well as necessary civic skills to vote.  Through obtaining civic skills, 
people learn and understand the political scene so that participation becomes as efficient as 
possible and less costly. These elements are closely related to individual and contextual 
determinants of political participation that will be further explained below.  
2.1.1 Education 
Among the most important factors in political participation research has been voter’s 
education level. Verba and Nie (1972) and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) were the first to 
highlight these findings, which have only been confirmed in later research (Brady et al., 1995, 
and Verba et. al, 1995). 
 
The studies show that when you are less educated, you are also less likely to vote. With 
respect to individual traits of the voter, they argue the following: Education helps develop the 
human capital and knowledge needed to meet the costs of political participation. One learns 
about the political process, the issues that are discussed and to form an opinion on these. The 
result is higher and more efficient participation amongst the groups that are better educated as 
the cost of participation is lowered. 
 
The effect of education on political participation is twofold. It also contributes to a person’s 
human capital level by the different people they meet and ideas and norms they’re exposed to. 
During their education they form social networks and obtain social capital that exposes them 
to other people’s views, opinions and competencies. This influences their political interest and 
motivates them to participate by building civic skills which brings down costs even further 
(Brady et al, 1995; La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998 ).    
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2.1.2 Income and Employment 
Much of the same mechanisms are at play when examining the role of employment and 
income. Again, the determinants have both an individual and contextual effect (see Isaksson 
et. al, 2014 for a discussion of this). Higher income is necessarily closely correlated with 
education, but it is most importantly a vital part of the opportunity cost mechanism. The more 
you earn, the less is the relative cost of participating. When considering individual political 
action, having a higher income will relax a person’s resource constraint and thereby facilitate 
more political activity (Brady et al., 2005). 
 
As mentioned above, several studies show that representatives’ responsiveness to the wishes, 
demands and enquiries of middle and high income constituents are much higher than to that of 
low-income constituents. Therefore the potential gain of reaching through to a representative 
can also be much higher the more income one has (Bartels, 2005; Griffin and Newman, 2005) 
 
In most cases people who earn an income acquire this through being employed. When 
examining the effect of employment on political participation, social networks are especially 
important. Whether or not you are employed affects if you are likely to be exposed to social 
settings where one can learn from other people’s knowledge and opinions and be recruited to 
networks, groups or clubs.  People can pursue their interests with others in similar situations 
as themselves and become increasingly aware of political matters that affect them. These 
networks can take any form and be either political or non-political organisations with unions, 
activity clubs or community groups as examples. It is argued that these organisations act as 
mobilising agencies, contributing to civic skills as well as motivational factors that stimulate 
engagement. Being unemployed thus cuts people off from political discussion and networks, 
rendering them with less resources that they can utilise in political activity.  Having a job 
therefore makes people more informed about their interests and capable of acting on them 
(Verba et al.,1995; Bratton et al., 2010) 
 
When the distribution of endowments within these fields are as skewed as political 
participation rates imply, the consequences can be many and severe. Political issues that have 
traditionally been the most important to the working class are down played and may be 
largely ignored due to the fact that the people who should be advocating these opinions don’t 
participate. Workers’ rights, the influence of unions, minimum wage levels and other 
 important economic issues aren’t sufficiently discussed and it may be that both political and 
economic inequality persists and deepens as a result (Bartels, 2005).  
2.1.3 Developing countries 
However, all the studies mentioned above were conducted on the United States or other 
Western countries. Evidence from developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin-America 
however, show trends that deviate from these results. One would perhaps expect the 
previously mentioned structural inequality mechanisms to be universal, and especially apply 
to developing countries as resource endowments and constraints are more likely to be binding 
in these areas of the world. Less developed political and physical infrastructure in addition to 
tighter individual resource constraints would indicate so.  
 
Nevertheless, studies by Isaksson (2010), Bratton (2008), Bratton et al. (2010) and Kuenzi 
and Lambbright (2010) show that even though education is often correlated with higher 
participation, it is not so for income. Education is only correlated with higher inter-election 
activity and with respect to income it seems like the poorer participate no less, and maybe 
even more, than the more well-off citizens.  
 
This naturally raises the question of why. Researchers propose two different explanations. 
One explanation could be that the poorer citizens use the channels of influence that they are 
given. Richer citizens can rely on other more direct methods of influence such as corruption, 
bribery and nepotism. The second is well-known and relies on the alleged importance of 
personal relationships and clientelism in African politics. Relatively resource poor people 
may be more prone to accept clientelist appeals, thereby increasing their participation rates.     
The resource curse 
Another trait that many of these developing countries have in common is the fact that a large 
percentage of their GDP is based on export-oriented resource extraction, especially in the 
SSA. Numerous studies have shown a strong correlation between resource wealth, corruption 
and weak institutions, in addition to other negative effects such as high levels of inequality, 
the development of enclave economies, less long-term investments, large public debt and 
more civil conflict. This effectively lowers economic growth significantly, and is popularly 
known as the resource curse (Van der Ploeg, 2011). 
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The narrative of most of these effects goes as follows: When vast amounts of resource rents 
fall into the hands of state leaders who are not sufficiently controlled by institutional checks 
and balances, the leaders, in effect, have access to unlimited amounts of money. The heads of 
states are then in no way forced to distribute the resource rents fairly among the countries’ 
citizens and can put it to any use that they see fit. This includes solely on themselves and their 
innermost circle. Potentially, they can also use this money to buy off opponents or citizens 
through clientilist schemes or huge inefficient public employment programs. Crack downs on 
civil unrest and political intimidation techniques are also quite common. As these 
developments evolve, governmental institutions begin to deteriorate even further as they lose 
more and more influence over their heads of State. Corruption and bribery becomes the new 
mean of political influence whilst efficiency and private enterprise continue to decline.   
 
These negative developments in a countries’ economy in the aftermath of receiving resource 
windfalls can in many cases be explained by, and result in low institutional quality. There are 
however varying point of views on this. Sachs and Warner (1997) claim that resource 
abundance has no effect on institutions, whilst Isham et al. (2003) say that they do. An article 
by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) reconcile the two views. They claim that there exists a 
“threshold level” of institutional quality where resource abundance becomes a blessing 
instead of a curse.  
 
They develop a model where a country’s growth rate is dependent on the institutional quality 
level that exists when the resources are discovered. The model makes a distinction between 
cases where production and rent-seeking are complementary and competitive activities. If a 
country initially has strong, accountable producer-friendly institutions, it is difficult for 
entrepreneurs to be rent-seekers without also being producers. This is not the case if 
institutions are grabber-friendly. Then the entrepreneurs will compete against each other 
trying to capture the rents from resource extraction fighting over what rents that do exist 
instead of creating more. Consequently, economic growth will be substantially lower than 
what is the case with producer-friendly institutions.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Resource rents with grabber- and producer friendly institutions 
 
Figures are taken from Mehlum et. al, 2006,  p. 1125-1126 
  
These so-called “grabber-friendly institutions” can develop in a variety of ways and take 
several different forms. A survey article by Van der Ploeg lists a whole variety of 
explanations. Among the most highlighted explanations is how resource rents can hinder 
democratic development and sustain dictatorships. The government in power receives 
resource rents that permit them to pacify decent through military action, nepotism and buying 
off opponents. The rents allow governments to “bribe” voters with low taxes, government 
jobs and unproductive yet popular policies. This prevents redistribution of political power and 
keeps the current regime in place because they to a large extent can avoid transparency, 
accountability and resist modernisation. Eventually, this results in corruption, rent-seeking, 
mismanaged institutions and a failing economy (2011, p.16-17).  
Maximizing the Benefits from Resource-based Industries 
There are important exceptions to this rule, countries who have not only managed to avoid the 
resource curse, but also have low inequality measures as well as high voter-turnout. The first 
step to achieving this is to make sure that resource related windfall stays within the country 
and benefits the population as a whole, and not just civil servants and the state elite. It is also 
vital that the multiplier effects aren’t exported and that linkage development occurs in the 
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vicinity of where the resource-extraction takes place, creating employment opportunities and 
economic growth in the region (Morris et al, 2011).  
 
Hirschman describes development as an incremental process where “One thing leads to 
another,” (1981, p.75) and highlights the importance of linkages in creating growth. He 
defines three different types of linkages through which a country’s economy can profit on the 
resource sector. Morris et al. (2011) build further on these and define financial, consumption 
and production linkages as the most important ones. For these linkages to develop both the 
state and private companies have to create and implement strategies and policies to maximise 
them. However, these are influenced by several determinants, both intrinsic and contextual.  
 
The intrinsic determinants refer to the fundamentals that have to be in place for a company to 
see it as profitable to start extracting resources and invest in an area. Krugman (1991) and 
Isard et al. (1998) point to, among other factors, logistics, flexibility and the relative costs of 
inputs and production. Contextual determinants are elements that the government can easier 
influence and promote, thereby creating an improved environment in which linkages and 
growth can develop both broader and faster. These include ownership, infrastructure, skills 
and capacity building, and policies and their implementation. (Morris et al.,2011; Moretti, 
2010; Eggert, 2002). 
 
Ownership is important in the sense that it can vary greatly how much knowledge the owners 
have of local skill, markets and suppliers. Depending on whether the concessionaires are 
privately or state owned their attitudes towards risk, profit and long-term investments can 
greatly influence how much of these local markets they make use of. Their attitudes towards 
corporate social responsibility can in these matters also be decisive. 
  
Investment in long-term projects such as infrastructure and skills-training could also be 
influenced by the ownership of the resources. Infrastructure can be both physical and social, 
and depending on its nature, it can create either large or virtually non-existent spill-over 
effects. Institutional development and roads would in this context be beneficial for the whole 
local community.  
 
Skills training and the development of technological know-how must also be viewed in a 
more long-term perspective. Companies and owners have the option to train locals rather than 
 import labour, and in this context a National System of Innovation could be very helpful.  In 
fact, all countries that have succeeded in resource-related industries outside of extraction have 
all had major programs investing in skills-training and research and development (Wright and 
Czelusta, 2004).  
 
Moretti (2010) develops a model of how local multipliers affect the economy and more 
specifically the size of the long term employment multiplier in the traded and non-traded 
sectors. He finds that multipliers have a much larger effect if the creation of a new position is 
in a high-tech industry with skilled rather than unskilled labour. Investment in skills-training 
and education could therefore be very profitable in the long run. 
 
However, in order to develop and influence the development of these factors, it is vital that 
local and national governments take responsibility for designing long- and short-term 
strategies and rules for the sector, and make sure that these are implemented and enforced. 
Cooperation with the private sector and civil society is in this respect paramount. 
  
Eggert (2002) has a more financial perspective with focus on welfare when he writes about 
how a country’s government should manage their natural resources both in the short and long 
run. He defines challenges within four different fields. The first is within creation, where 
governments have to facilitate extraction so that it goes about as efficiently as possible. They 
also need to take social preferences for environmental quality and other social and cultural 
values into concern. The second is within distribution. The government needs to develop a 
scheme for how the wealth should be distributed amongst the general population.  Third, the 
country needs to build institutions and mechanisms for handling volatile prices and structural 
changes in the economy. They must also seek to avoid problems that are often associated with 
resource wealth such as rent-seeking behaviour and corruption. Lastly, these countries also 
face challenges related to investment, ensuring that future generations also benefit from the 
wealth. 
 
 Empirical evidence 
It is of course not always the case that the factors outlined above are followed or implemented 
in such a way that positive economic effects in the local community follow. The empirical 
evidence is scarce, but the research that does exist on local welfare effects of resource-based 
industries varies not surprisingly in their findings.  
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Vicente (2010) compares the West African island states of Sao Tomé and Principe and Cape 
Verde with respect to changes in perceived corruption levels after STP found oil. By 
gathering household survey data on corruption perception across a wide range of industries 
and public services, he finds that STP has in fact experiences higher perception of corruption 
since oil was discovered. The clearest increases were found in vote buying, education (namely 
in the allocation of scholarships) and customs. He interprets this as a sign of increased 
competition for state resources. However, he also emphasizes that corruption need not have an 
overall detrimental effect on an economy, and that more research is needed in these areas.        
 
Aragon and Rud (2013a) also use household data, but focus on local communities around a 
Peruvian gold mine.  They find positive economic effects and multipliers, especially within 
the agricultural sector and hypothesize that this is because of a corporate program to 
implement the local communities in their supply chain. Their second article on local 
economic effects of mining activity ( Aragon and Rud, 2013b) examines pollution spill-over 
effects on agriculture in Ghana. Here, they find that emissions from modern gold mines 
reduce agricultural productivity with almost 40%. They highlight that these agricultural 
effects very rarely are included in cost-benefit analyses on mining projects, and that mining 
could consequently entail large redistribution effects from local population to the central 
government.     
 
Caselli and Michaels (2013) also find overall negative welfare effects from resource 
extraction in Brazil. They conclude that oil windfalls, either offshore or onshore, have little or 
no positive effects on municipal non-oil GDP compositions. They point out that municipal 
revenues and spending seems to increase, but as survey-based measures of public goods and 
provision and household income reports no such differences, it is likely that most of the 
windfall end up in the pockets of civil servants. 
 
and Tolonen (2013) seek to investigate local effects of resource extraction on a larger scale by 
exploring how the expansion of mining activity in SSA has impacted female employment. By 
matching panel data on industrial mines with survey data from across the continent, they 
investigate the effect of the openings and closing of mines. Their results show that a mine 
opening induces a shift in employment sectors where women move from working in 
agriculture to services. The likelihood of women earning cash income increases and they 
 work less seasonally. When a mine opens there are in other words several sectors that spurs 
job creation than solely those in the mining workforce. However, most of these effects are 
reversed when mines close.      
 
Michaels (2011) examines historical data on southern USA and examines whether resource 
abundance slows down industrialisation, accumulation of education and if it leads to higher 
inequality. He finds that from 1940-1990 the manufacturing sector in oil abundant counties 
were of the same absolute size, but employed less people. These counties profited on a better 
educated workforce and higher GDP per capita which lead to higher inwards migration. By 
1990 most of these advantages had diminished, but they still enjoyed slightly higher GDP per 
capita without inequality measures being any worse than in their neighbouring counties. All in 
all, Michaels concludes that even though resource based specialisation involves some long run 
costs, it can also spur long-term development.    
Summing up 
To sum up, research shows that economic and political inequality is closely related and that 
the two can mutually reinforce each other. Factors such as income, education and employment 
affect the level of both. Historically, these factors have explained a lot of the variation in 
political participation, but trends in developing countries seem to deviate somewhat from this. 
Why this is the case can be due to a number of factors that may or may not be a result of the 
resource curse. In order to escape this resource curse and make sure that resource extraction 
and exports leads to broad economic growth, the public and private sector as well as civil 
society must cooperate to ensure that ownership is long-term, sufficient infrastructure is built, 
that skill and capacity-building is on top of the agenda and most of all that the policies that are 
developed with all of these factors in mind are actually implemented and monitored. 
Macroeconomic issues also have to be taken into account. The question is then whether or not 
linkage development ensues, and that the consequent higher employment rates and economic 
growth in the area surrounding the mine has the positive effects on political participation that 
standard theory predicts. 
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3 Data and Definitions 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I will combine a longitudinal data set on large-scale mineral mines in Africa 
with Afrobarometer survey-data. The survey-data includes point-coordinates (GPS) on where 
the respondents live, which allows us to link them to mining activity.
1
  
 
First, I link all the respondents to the different mines by measuring how far away from a 
mine’s centre, given by its GPS-coordinate, the respondents live. This gives the variable 
kilometres which measures the distance each respondent has to a mine of any sort. The 
average distance to a mine is then 188 kilometres. The next step is to put all the respondents 
in groups that categorise how far away from mines they live. I calculate distances from the 
mine in circles with radii of 10, 25, 50, 75 and up to 100 kilometres. The mines are split up 
into three groups; active, inactive or suspended. In the given year, active mines engage in 
extraction and production, inactive mines have not been opened yet and suspended mines 
have been active, but are now closed.  
 
I combine the above to construct an indicator variable that answers the following question: Is 
there at least one active mine within x kilometres of the respondent’s household? If not, is 
there at least one mine that is inactive, or one mine that is suspended within the same range? 
If the answer is still no, the respondent will be coded as living in a non-mining area. However, 
if the person in question lives within the given range of several mines that are defined as 
active, inactive or suspended, the respondent will be coded as belonging to the treatment 
group if at least one of these were active the year she answered the survey. When looking at 
mine opening effects the respondents that live close to suspended mines are excluded. The 
same applies for respondents that live in the vicinity of inactive mines when examining the 
effect of the closing of mines.  
 
                                                 
1
 The matching and empirical strategy in this thesis follows that of Kotsadam and Tolonen (2013) 
 It is here assumed that any individual that lives within a given distance of an active mine will 
attempt to seek employment there. Also, future mines are assumed to have little effect on the 
economy, although there may be some activity related to the pre-production stages. The 
benefits from an active mine thus dominates those of one that is inactive. The respondents in 
question are then coded as active ==1 and inactive ==0 as these are mutually exclusive.  
 
I use 50 kilometres as the baseline cut-off distance for when people seek employment at the 
mines. When the distance to the mine is greater than this, transportation costs that arise when 
working that far away from one’s home is assumed to outweigh the benefits that accrue from 
employment. There are two reasons for why this might be. Firstly, the cost in terms of 
information and transport increase with distance from the mine. Secondly, the economic 
footprint of the mine decreases with distance. Other cut-off distances will however be used to 
test whether these assumptions hold. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of respondents across countries and mines 
 
Countries Total  # of respondents Active50 Inactive50 Suspended50 
Benin 2398 64 0 0 
Botswana 2275 391 24 0 
Burkina Faso 1200 160 32 16 
Ghana 2397 646 48 631 
Kenya 2368 0 0 96 
Lesotho 2361 832 230 72 
Liberia 1200 40 0 72 
Madagascar 2631 0 0 0 
Malawi 2387 0 0 0 
Mali 2385 120 26 0 
Mozambique 2367 236 0 0 
Namibia 2194 407 2 6 
Nigeria 4479 86 0 54 
Senegal 2394 348 0 136 
South Africa 3932 1398 20 275 
Tanzania 1891 182 0 0 
Uganda 4776 0 0 240 
Zambia 2400 320 0 32 
Zimbabwe 2236 711 0 749 
Sum  48271 5941 382 2379 
 
 
In total, close to 12% of the people who answered the surveys live within a 50 km radius of an 
active mine. This adds up to 5941 people. With respect to inactive and suspended mines 
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within the same distance, the percentages of people living in these areas are 0.8 % and 4.7 % 
respectively. This makes a total of 382 people in the vicinity of inactive mines and 2379 
people in areas with suspended mines. These numbers could indicate that there is a degree of 
worker migration towards mining areas. So-called mining towns are a good example of this 
(Lange, 2006; Corno and de Walque, 2012). 
Mining data 
I use a dataset on the location of past (suspended), current (active) and future (inactive) 
industrial mines in Africa called the Raw Material Dataset (RMD). The mines are geocoded 
with point coordinates and yearly information on production levels as well as what is 
produced. The production volumes that are given are however somewhat unreliable as 
different mines and companies have different measures for different types of minerals. This 
makes it impossible to compare these numbers. The status of the different mines should 
nevertheless be reliable. 
 
The data goes back to 1975 and up until 2010, but as I only have survey data for 2005-2006 
and 2008-2009 I focus on these two periods. In total, I make use of 263 mines, of which there 
are 180 active, 13 inactive and 79 suspended. All of these mines are linked to survey 
respondents and some of the respondents are linked to several mines. 
    
The RMD dataset focuses on mines of industrial size and thereby excludes all forms of 
artisanal, informal and small-scale mining (ASM). This type of mining activity in Africa is in 
many places an important part of people’s livelihoods as it can exist both alongside and 
replace industrial sized mining activity. UNECA (2011) estimate that 8,1 million people are 
engaged in ASM. The definition for ASM mining is in this context set to a maximum of 50 
employees and that the work conducted is more labour- than capital intensive. Nevertheless, 
ASM is overall of a much smaller format than industrial mining, and I therefore assume that 
the multiplier effects in these cases will be too small to have any recognisable effect. The 
external validity of the results from the empirical strategy that is utilised in this thesis will 
therefore only applies to large-scale mining. 
 
 Afrobarometer survey data 
The individual-level data are taken from the third and fourth round of the Afrobarometer 
survey. They were conducted in 18 countries from March 2005 through February 2006, and 
20 countries between March 2008 and June 2009 respectively. I have excluded the surveys 
conducted in Cape Verde in the fourth round since matches between people and mines didn’t 
appear. Burkina Faso and Liberia were included in the fourth round, but not in the third. 
However, this shouldn’t influence the basis for evaluation when using my DiD-approach. All 
together, the data is based on interviews with randomly selected individuals that are 
representative on a national level. My data consists of 48271 individual surveys, 21822 from 
round three and 26449 from round four when excluding those from Cape Verde. 
 
My main outcome variables of interest are those concerning political participation. This is a 
very wide term where a lot of different types of actions could be included. However, I am of 
the opinion that political participation has to involve deliberate action where the aim is to 
influence political outcomes. I define it as “citizen acts to influence the selection of, and/or 
the actions taken by political representatives” Conge (1988).  Operationalising this definition 
must accordingly entail recording some sort of action where the individual actively seeks to 
influence politicians or the make-up of their country’s political elite. Besides voting which is 
the most obvious indicator, it is also important to try to capture how much people engage in 
politics between elections. The dependent variables in the regression on election and inter-
election activity are therefore proxied by whether or not they voted in the last election, and 
whether they have participated in a demonstration over the last year. Those who were too 
young to vote or can’t remember if they have participated in such activities have been 
excluded from the data.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Definition Mean s.dev 
Mine variables    
Kilometers Distance to active, inactive or suspended mine 1,884 1,594 
Active50 At least one active mine  within 50 km of respondent 0,059 0,235 
Inactive50 At least one inactive mine within 50 km of respondent 0,002 0,049 
Suspended50 At least one suspended mine within 50 km of respondent 0,027 0,161 
Dependent variables    
Working  1 if respondent is currently in employment 0,352 0,478 
Voted  1 if respondent voted in the last election 0,725 0,447 
Demonstrated 1 if respondent participated in demonstration during past year  0,133 0,340 
Raisedissue 1 if respondent joined others to raise an issue during past year 0,544 0,490 
Meeting 1 if respondent attended a community meeting during past year 0,672 0,470 
Control variables    
Urban 1 if respondent is living in an urban area 0,368 0,482 
Age Age in years 36,33 14,530 
Age2 Age squared 15,31 12,895 
Female 1 if respondent is female 0,501 0,500 
Education  Level of education , 1: No education – 10: Postgraduate  3,117 2,017 
Often_without_cash 1 if respondent goes often without cash 0,672 0,470 
Radio news Access to radio news, 0: never – 4: every day 3,068 1,354 
Member,  religious group 1 if respondent is member of a religious group 0,742 0,437 
Other variables    
Free and fair elections Elections, 1: Not free and fair – 4: Completely free and fair 2,529 1,204 
Local corruption Corruptness of local gov’t councillors, 0: none – 3: all of them   1,286 0,867 
Careful what you say Concerning politics, 0: never – 3: Always 1,797 1,115 
 
 
Overall, the data shows that people are generally quite interested in politics, with over 72 % 
having voted in the last election and 13.34 % having participated in a demonstration. There is 
however large countrywide variation in the data, where for example, the percentage of people 
having voted range from over 90% in Benin to around 63% in Botswana and Lesotho. The 
variations in having participated in a demonstration range from under 5% to almost 20%.  
 
Other factors that can influence the level of political participation include local corruption 
levels, the degree of political intimidation, and the fairness of elections. Variables that 
describe the perception of these have been included to try and account for any local 
institutional resource curse effects that might be particularly prevalent in mining areas. These 
variables are described in table 2. 
 
Other individual control variables like whether or not they are employed, how much 
education they have received, whether they have often gone without cash, if they have access 
 to radio news and whether they are a member of a religious congregation relates to the 
discussion in the theory chapter on resource constraints. The aim is to show how much an 
effect the individual resource base has on political participation rates. Demographic control 
variables are also included; these are displayed in table 2 and 3. They do not appear to vary 
much between the control and treatment groups, although it is noteworthy that the people 
living in inactive mining areas are more often unemployed, living in slightly less urban areas 
receive less education. The standard deviations on these means are very high, meaning that 
any conclusions drawn on the basis of these numbers would be uncertain. 
 
Table 3: Treatment and control groups 
 
 Active50 Inactive50 Suspended50 
Variable Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev 
Mine variables       
Kilometers 0,226 0,157 0,372 0,120 0,282 0,144 
Dependent variables       
Working 0,366 0,482 0,189 0,392 0,381 0,486 
Voted 0,704 0,456 0,725 0,447 0,725 0,447 
Demonstrated 0,154 0,361 0,064 0,245 0,093 0,290 
Raised issue 0,511 0,500 0,606 0,489 0,528 0,499 
Meeting  0,614 0,487 0,767 0,423 0,609 0,489 
Control variables       
Urban 0,529 0,499 0,408 0,492 0,475 0,499 
Age 37,324 15,0143 41,606 17,043 36,802 15,111 
Age2 16,184 13,4372 20,208 15,836 15,826 13,656 
Female 0,500 0,500 0,497 0,500 0,503 0,500 
Education  3,516 1,931 2,554 1,868 3,648 1,833 
Often_without_cash 0,590 0,492 0,641 0,480 0,646 0,478 
Radio news 3,122 1,340 2,513 1,553 2,988 1,460 
Member of religious group 0,722 0,448 0,568 0,496 0,804 0,397 
Other variables       
Free and fair elections 2,529 1,238 1,843 1,089 2,660 1,203 
Local corruption 1,287 0,873 0,817 0,861 1,266 0,792 
Careful what you say 1,814 1,144 1,603 1,226 1,860 1,134 
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4 Empirical Strategy 
 
 
 
 
This thesis aims to investigate how mining activity affects political participation in SSA. I 
plan to do this by combining survey data and GPS-coordinates, examining variables with two 
different strategies. First, by investigating if there are significant differences in variable values 
close to, and further away from mines at specific points in time. To examine the strength of 
these findings, I also employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strategy. 
Because the ideal empirical strategy of conducting a randomized controlled experiment is 
unattainable, a natural experiment where real-world conditions and data mimic what would 
have happened in a randomized control experiment is the best viable option. A DiD-strategy 
fulfils these criteria under certain assumptions, and provides both a well-defined treatment 
group and a valid counterfactual control group.  
4.1  Difference and distance 
To begin with, I examine the differences in outcomes using an identification strategy that is 
purely spatial. By studying how answers to survey questions vary across space, and differ 
whether they are asked to people who live close to a mine or further away from it, we can 
obtain results that indicate whether or not mining activity can have an effect on employment 
status, political participation rates, election fairness, political intimidation rates and local 
corruption. A vector of individual controls including variables related to the resource 
constraint theory as well as resource curse perception is incorporated in the regressions. 
Country and year fixed effects are also added. The regression is of the following form: 
 
Yit = β1 · kilometers +  λXi  +  αr + gt + εit 
 
However, it is important to remember that the results from these regressions are only 
suggestive as there can be other differences between areas closer and further away from the 
mines that aren’t accounted or controlled for. If this regression were to be the only results, 
 strong assumptions concerning population characteristics and mine opening would have to be 
made.  
 
Therefore, I expand the difference-and-distance identification by adding a temporal 
component. Together, these components make up the differences-in-differences approach. 
This way, one can compare areas and results before and after a mine has opened/closed and 
not only areas that are within or outside the vicinity of a mine. Hence, this is an attempt to 
control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may influence selection into being 
a mining area. 
 Differences-in differences 
Thus, my DiD estimation method combines a spatial-temporal estimation strategy with survey 
data. It aims to capture the effect of some kind of change on a treatment group by comparing 
it to a control group. Before the change takes place, the control and treatment groups have to 
have similar development trends, but the levels can still be different, as shown in figure 1 
below. In absence of the treatment, the difference between the treatment group (A) and the 
control group (B) would be constant over time. However, if a change in the treatment group 
takes place, the aim is to establish the size and direction of the treatment effect by comparing 
the results in the treatment and control groups. How large is the estimated difference between 
A’ and A?  
 
Figure 2: DiD-strategy 
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In this particular case, one can estimate the treatment effect, i.e the effect of mining activity 
on working status, political participation and resource curse measures, by combining data on 
GPS-coordinates of mines and when these were active, inactive or suspended with  survey 
data across time periods, both within and outside the vicinity of mines. Together these factors 
make up the two differences I need in order to identify a specific trend in a mining area. The 
first difference is the survey answers in mining areas before, during and after mining activity. 
This gives the results for points A and A’.  The second difference gives points B from the 
answers to the same survey questions as in the mining areas, except this time they are asked to 
people that live in areas that are too far away from the mines to be affected by the activity 
there. By examining the different survey answers one can determine how much, or if, political 
participation, employment and resource curse trends have changed as a result of mining 
activity. 
 
To determine the size of the treatment effect, the identification strategies distinguishes 
between three main groups of people. The first group lives within 50 km distance to one or 
more active mines. The second group lives within 50 km of an inactive mine or suspended 
mine. The third group consists of people that live more than 50 km away from any mine. The 
two baseline DiD regressions measures the effect of a mine opening and a mine closing. 
 
Yit = β1 · active50 + β2 · inactive50 + λX + αr + gt i  + εit 
 
Yit = β1 · active50 + β2 · suspended50 + λXi  + αr + gt + εit 
 
 
Where Y is the outcome for an individual i in year t, it measures employment status, political 
participation either in the form of voting activity or participation in demonstrations, or 
perception of local resource curse effects in the form of corruption, free and fair elections and 
political intimidation. These are regressed on a dummy active50 for whether or not the person 
lives within 50 km of at least one mine, and either a dummy inactive50 for whether or not the 
person lives within 50 km of a mine that hasn’t opened yet, or a dummy suspended50 for 
whether or not the person lives within 50 km of a mine that has been closed. In addition, a 
vector of individual control variables and time and country fixed effects are added. These are 
the same as in the difference-and distance regressions. 
  
 F-tests on the dummy variables regarding production status in the two DiD-regressions are 
then performed to show the difference between the active and inactive/suspended variables. 
The aim of a F-test is to show that there is a significant difference between the variables and 
that they therefore have different effects on the political participation outcome rates. 
 
However, beside the occurrence of mineral resources, there can also be other factors within a 
country or a region that can influence the exact location of a mine. Although the placement of 
mineral resources is random, the discovery and extraction of such deposits is not (Eggert, 
2002). Morris et al (2011) call these intrinsic determinants, and Krugman (1991) and Isard et. 
al (1998) highlight the access to, and relative price of inputs, transportation costs and 
agglomeration costs as most important when a decision is to be reached on whether or not to 
open a mineral deposit. 
Fixed effects 
If these are constant over time and only appear on a country level they can be controlled for 
by country specific fixed effects. This variable can also take into account other time-invariant 
factors such as the quality of regional institutions, specific mining strategies, attitudes and 
traditions regarding politics and participation in society, levels of economic development and 
sectorial composition that are specific for a single country. This improves the explanatory 
power and makes the causal claims of the regression more robust.  
 
Individual fixed effects such as age, gender, and living in urban areas are also included in the 
regression to improve the explanatory power and control for omitted variables. It is however 
important to keep in mind that these are inherently prone to measurement errors which could 
result in attenuation biases. Fixed effects are usually persistent over time, but need not be. 
Employment status is an example. However, since measurement errors tend to vary from 
survey to survey, these two effects together may lead to variations in observed year-to-year 
changes in the fixed effects that are mostly noise. This might result in smaller fixed effects 
estimators, and they should therefore be interpreted with caution (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
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5 Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
 
The results from the baseline regressions largely reject the hypothesis that people living in 
active mining areas are more politically engaged than others, even though the results 
regarding demonstration effects are stronger than in the voting activity regressions. I do 
however find that economic multiplier effects that have a positive impact on unemployment 
rates are present in active mining areas. This indicates that more people have a job, earn more 
and come into contact with networks of people in similar situations as themselves when living 
in mining areas. Individual and contextual factors that in theory should contribute to increased 
levels of political activity are consequently present, but they have very little effect on actual 
participation rates. Previous research points to similar findings and state that the amount of 
pecuniary resources a person has at its disposal has little effect on their willingness to 
participate, but offers little evidence to why this is the case.  
 
One explanation for the absence of results could be that local resource curse effects come into 
play, effectively limiting political activity. In fact, when I investigate the effect of mining 
activity on levels of local corruption, political intimidation and the fairness of elections, these 
are all positive and significant, giving some suggestive evidence towards why patterns of 
political activity differ in SSA compared to western countries. 
 
In the following chapter I first perform difference and distance regressions on working status, 
political activity and resource curse effects, before I compare these answers with similar 
difference-in-differences regressions. I then go on to try and explain the robustness in the 
results I found.  
Difference and distance results   
5.1.1 Employment  status 
When regressing employment status on the number of kilometres to the nearest mine the 
estimated coefficients are negative and highly significant, meaning that the people who live 
 further way from the mines are less likely to be working (Table 4). This gives strong support 
to my initial assumption that it is easier to find work in mining areas, thereby laying the 
foundation for relaxing individuals’ resource constraints through higher income and more 
knowledge and social capital acquisition through attaining larger social networks. 
 
Table 4: Difference and Distance Regressions on Employment and Political Participation  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES voted demonstrated working 
    
kilometers 0.000 0.001 -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
urban -0.041*** 0.003 0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
age 0.039*** 0.002** 0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.036*** -0.002*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.024*** -0.046*** -0.098*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
education 0.003** 0.010*** 0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
often_without_cash 0.005 0.008* -0.068*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
radio_news 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
member_religious 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
local_corruption -0.015*** 0.011***  
 (0.003) (0.002)  
careful -0.004** 0.005***  
 (0.002) (0.002)  
elections_free 0.007*** 0.001  
 (0.002) (0.002)  
Constant -0.191*** 0.162*** -0.442*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) 
    
Observations 36,410 35,768 46,998 
R-squared 0.161 0.034 0.176 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
 
The other variables have estimated outcomes as expected and are all highly significant. Age 
and education level has a positive impact on working status whilst age2 and the female 
dummy have negative coefficients. The control variables related to monetary resources and 
radio access are positive and significant, but somewhat surprisingly being a member of a 
28 
 
religious group is not. Labour market theory would predict that being a part of a large network 
would make it easier to find a job (see for example Myers et al., 1991; Ioannides and Loury, 
2004). 
5.1.2  Political participation 
The difference and distance regressions for political participation, represented by voter 
turnout and demonstration activity, give less uplifting results (Table 4).  There are no 
significant effects in either direction, indicating that living close to a mine may have no effect 
on political participation rates at all. Part of the explanation for the absence of any results 
could be that the kilometres variable measures the distance to any mine, including the inactive 
and suspended ones, potentially giving the estimates a downward bias.  
 
The individual control variables are significant and have estimated coefficients with signs 
mostly as expected. Age and education are positive whilst the female dummy and age2 are 
negative. It is worth noticing that this partially contradicts Isaksson’s (2010) findings 
regarding education’s effect on political activity. My regressions indicate that education has a 
positive impact not only in developed countries, but also in SSA on both election and inter-
election activity.  
 
With respect Isaksson’s other findings however, the results largely coincide. Having access to 
radio news and being a member of a religious group has positive significant effects, meaning 
that determinants related to information are important when an individual decides to 
participate politically. The coefficients are also positive for the variable concerning being 
often without cash on both voting and demonstration activity, although it is only significant in 
the latter case. According to this variable it would then seem that lack of funds has no, or a 
positive effect on political participation which supports Isaksson’s findings and contradicts 
the resource constraint theory.  
 
This claim also receives some support from the results of the urban dummy. It is highly 
significant and negative in the voting regression and positive and insignificant with respect to 
demonstrations. This indicates that respondents living in cities vote less than those living in 
rural areas, and that, with some uncertainty; people in rural areas demonstrate more. If we 
assume that unemployment rates and information and transportation are generally lower in 
urban areas, the results, especially regarding voting activity, supports the claim by Isaksson 
 that poorer people participate more  This contradicts theory and she calls for more research 
into why this is the case.  
 
Part of the explanation could be that civil liberties are limited and that the institutional quality 
is low. Both Isaksson et al. (2014) and Krishna (2002) point out these factors as crucial for 
voter turnout and participation rates. The estimated coefficients concerning the degree of local 
corruption, free and fair elections and political intimidation confirms this picture although in 
very different ways depending on whether the results concern voting or demonstration 
activity. With respect to voter turnout, local corruption, less free and fair elections, and to 
what extent people feel they have to be careful when talking about politics, all have negative 
significant effects. 
 
With respect to demonstration activity however, the result seem to be opposite, inspiring 
people to voice their discontent. Local corruption levels and the degree of political 
intimidation have significant positive effects on having participated in a demonstration, whilst 
whether the last election was free and fair has an insignificant positive effect. A good 
explanation for these results could be that political intimidation is largely concentrated on 
electoral processes and not on inter-election activity. Findings by Isaksson et al. (2014) 
support this view. 
5.1.3 Resource curse effects 
The regressions for each of the resource curse variables show that institutional quality and 
civil liberties deteriorate with proximity to mining activity. 
The perception of local corruption decreases with distance to mines. It is nevertheless 
important to keep in mind that the mean value is 1,286 on a scale between 0 and 3. This 
shows that most respondents believe that corruption is a real problem whether they live close 
to mines or not. 83,04 % of the respondents believe that at least some of their local 
representatives are corrupt.   
The control variables show that a person perceives their local councillors as increasingly 
corrupt when they live in urban areas, have higher education, and have radio access. If a 
respondent is a member of a religious group or increasingly old (age2 variable) they have 
more trust in their local representatives and think them less corrupt. A person’s age or sex has 
no significant effects on their trust in local councillors. 
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Table 5: Difference and Distance Regressions on Local Resource Curse effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES local corruption free and fair elections careful what you say 
    
kilometers -0.007** 0.012*** -0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
urban 0.086*** -0.018 -0.016 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
age 0.002 -0.002 -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.003** 0.003 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
female -0.013 -0.006 0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
education 0.025*** -0.008*** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
often_without_cash 0.082*** 0.025** 0.056*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
radio_news 0.009*** 0.001 -0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
member_religious -0.025** 0.031** 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 1.088*** 1.638*** 2.391*** 
 (0.048) (0.060) (0.058) 
    
Observations 39,754 43,387 45,093 
R-squared 0.107 0.229 0.086 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
 
Some of the same effects are found when examining whether people perceived the last 
election as free and fair. The further away from mines the respondents live, the more they 
perceive the elections as equitable. The more education they have the more critical they are, 
possibly reflecting that these people have higher standards towards what democratic elections 
are and should be. Members of religious groups again have more faith in the system and 
perceive elections as more free and fair. 
 
When looking at the results for the political intimidation measure, proxied by if respondents 
feel like they need to be careful of what they say when talking about politics, people are less 
worried about this the further away from mines they live. The respondents become less 
careful with age, whilst females and the poor are more cautious. It is nevertheless important to 
 remember that this result can be upwards biased by local social and political norms and not 
just by actual political intimidation. 
 
With respect to the difference and distance regressions it is also important to bear in mind that 
there may be factors that aren’t accounted for. Time-varying effects and difference in areas 
close to and further away from mines may influence the results in either direction. Hopefully, 
the full difference-in differences regressions can give a more comprehensive picture of how 
mining activity influences political participation.     
Difference-in-Differences Regressions 
 
In the full difference-in-difference regressions I replace the kilometres variable with an 
active50 variable that includes all the respondents that live within a 50 km radius of an active 
mine. This is the treatment group. I compare this group with respondents who live in an 
inactive50 or suspended50 area which are the control groups. Furthermore, I test whether 
there are differences between them by performing an F-test on their estimated coefficients. 
The results are described and explained below. 
5.1.4 Employment status 
The full DiD regressions (see table 6) further bolster the findings of mining activity’s positive 
effects on employment status compared to both inactive and suspended activity. The sign of 
the active50 coefficient is positive and significant in both regressions, whilst inactive50 and 
suspended50 are negative as expected although only the inactive50 coefficient is significant. 
However, the F-tests confirm that there is a significant area difference in both cases. Living in 
an area with an active mine makes it more likely to have employment than living in areas 
where mines haven’t opened yet or have been closed. The estimated impact of mine openings 
on employment rates is consequently an increase of 7,1 percentage points.
2
 In comparison, the 
effect of increasing a person’s education level by two categories on a scale from 1 to 10 has 
approximately the same effect. Estimating an exact effect on the closing of mines is difficult 
as the estimated suspended50 coefficient is insignificant. 
   
 
  
                                                 
2
 This figure is found by performing a subtraction of the estimated coefficients of Active50-inactive50.  
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Table 6: Difference in Differences Regressions on Employment Status 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES working working 
   
active50 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
inactive50 -0.052**  
 (0.023)  
suspended50  -0.008 
  (0.010) 
urban 
 
age 
0.043*** 
(0,005) 
0.030*** 
0.041*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.099*** -0.098*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Education 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
often_without_cash -0.069*** -0.068*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
radio_news 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
member_religious 0.006 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -0.388*** -0.448*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
   
Observations 44,672 46,998 
R-squared 0.175 0.176 
F test: 8.928 6.478 
p value 0.00281 0.0109 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
 
5.1.5 Political participation regressions 
When looking at the political participation regressions, the full DiD-approach gives more 
uplifting results than the difference and distance regressions, but they are still not 
unambiguously conclusive.  
 
Voted 
When voted is the regressand the results (see table 7) are very unclear with estimated 
coefficients that are small and vastly insignificant. Active50 and inactive50 are negative, 
whilst suspended50 is positive. This makes it hard to conclude in either direction. The F-tests 
 are therefore accordingly unclear and this makes it difficult to establish whether voting trends 
change with mining activity at all. 
 
It is however worth noticing that the estimated coefficients of the resource curse variables are 
all significant at a 5% level with coefficients that effect voter turnout negatively with respect 
to corruption and political intimidation and positively when elections are perceived as free 
and fair. If a respondent perceives all her local council men as corrupt, the likelihood that she 
voted in the last election decreased by 42 percent points. The resource constraint variables do 
not have the same explanatory power, although education seems to have some positive effect. 
 
Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Regressions on Voting Activity  
 (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES Voted voted 
   
active50 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
inactive50 -0.002  
 (0.025)  
suspended50 
 
urban 
 
 
-0.037*** 
0.010 
(0,011) 
-0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
age 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
education 0.002* 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
often_without_cash 0.005 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
radio_news 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
member_religious 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
local_corruption -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Careful what you say -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
elections_free 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.178*** -0.193*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) 
   
Observations 34,551 36,410 
R-squared 0.160 0.161 
F test: 0.0107 1.062 
p value 0.918 0.303 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
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Demonstrated  
The regressions with demonstration activity as the dependent variable are more uplifting. All 
the area variables have signs as expected with the treatment group variables being positive, 
and the control group coefficients being negative. However, only the active50 variables are 
significant. The F-tests show that there is a difference in patterns in the suspended areas, but 
the test on inactive areas is inconclusive as the p-value of the F-test is only 11.5. This could 
be because the selection of respondents living in the vicinity of inactive mines is relatively 
small with only 382 individuals. This gives a high standard error which makes the results less 
robust. When comparing p-values, similar patterns can be found in the voted regressions.  
 
Table 8: Difference-in-Differences Regressions on Demonstration Activity 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects are included, but they aren’t displayed 
 (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES Demonstrated Demonstrated 
   
active50 0.014** 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
inactive50 -0.022  
 (0.022)  
suspended50 
 
urban 
 
 
0.004 
-0.015 
(0,009) 
0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.046*** -0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Education 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
often_without_cash 0.008* 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
radio_news 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
member_religious 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
local_corruption 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Careful what you say 0.004** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
elections_free 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.051** 0.162*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) 
   
Observations 33,905 35,768 
R-squared 0.034 0.034 
F test 2.481 7.254 
p value 0.115 0.00708 
 With respect to the control variables it is most noteworthy that education is now positive and 
highly significant, again supporting Isakssons (2010) findings. All the resource constraint 
variables are also positive and significant including being often without cash. This strengthens 
the view that poor people at least participate more in intra-election politics. Following the 
results in the difference and distance regressions I again find that the resource curse variables 
have a positive impact on demonstration participation unlike the voted regressions. Increasing 
perception of corruption and political intimidation has positive and significant coefficients 
whilst whether elections are free and fair has a positive yet insignificant effect. Here, if a 
respondent is of the opinion that all her local politicians are corrupt, the likelihood that she 
has participated in a demonstration the past year increases with 33%. 
5.1.6 Resource curse effects 
Further investigating the local resource curse effects gives largely the same results as in the 
difference and distance regressions which especially apply for the control variables. The 
results for all three regressions are displayed below.   
 
 With respect to perception of corruption amongst local government representatives, the 
coefficients for active50, inactive50 and suspended50 have signs as expected and the F-tests 
are highly significant. Corruption is consequently perceived to be substantially higher in 
active mining areas. I find that a mine opening leads to a 6.7% increase in the mean.
3
 
 
The same can be said for perception of political intimidation where the area variables follow 
the same patterns as the corruption regression. Consequently, people feel that they have to be 
more careful about what they say regarding politics where there is active mining extraction 
compared to inactive and suspended areas. 
  
With respect to free and fair elections the results are unambiguously negative for active 
mining areas when suspended50 is the control group, whilst with inactive areas, both active50 
and inactive50 coefficients are negative with inactive50 being the most negative. Both these 
coefficients are significant, and the F-test confirms that there is a difference in patterns across 
the two types of areas. This could be due to the before mentioned non-randomness of mining 
locations.  
 
                                                 
3
 This results is derived by subtracting active50-inactive50=0.194. this translates to6.7% of the mean 1.3 
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Table 9: DiD Regressions on local resource curse effects
  (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES local corruption local corruption free and fair elections free and fair elections careful what you say careful what you say 
active50 0.053*** 0.020*** -0.072*** -0.064*** 0.042** 0.036** 
 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
inactive50 -0.141*** 
 
-0.231*** 
 
-0.218*** 
 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.058) 
 
suspended50 
 
-0.008 
 
0.095*** 
 
-0.052 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.026) 
urban 0.080*** 0.041*** -0.014 -0.018 -0.016 -0.015 
 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
age 0.002 0.030*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.004** -0.033*** 0.003 0.003 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
female -0.012 -0.098*** -0.001 -0.006 0.033*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
education 0.025*** 0.036*** -0.008** -0.009*** 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
often_without_cash 0.084*** -0.068*** 0.030** 0.025** 0.058*** 0.055*** 
 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
radio_news 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.002 0.001 -0.007* -0.007* 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
member_religious -0.024** 0.004 0.034*** 0.030** 0.009 0.007 
 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.808*** -0.386*** 1.658*** 1.660*** 2.399*** 2.144*** 
 
(0.052) (0.024) (0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.061) 
Observations 37,733 46,998 41,212 43,387 42,828 45,093 
R-squared 0.110 0.176 0.229 0.229 0.083 0.086 
F test: 15.34 6.478 6.847 31.32 19.40 9.863 
p value 8.99e-05 0.0109 0.00888 2.20e-08 1.06e-05 0.00169 
 Robustness of results 
Although the theory on determinants of political participation intuitively makes a lot of sense, 
there are very clearly some unknown determinants that drive the results when examining 
participation rates in SSA. Whatever these are, it is important to acknowledge that 
participation rates, especially with respect to voting, are quite high whether people live in 
mining areas or not, with a mean of 70.4 % when living in active mining areas and 72.7% 
otherwise. The relative variation in demonstration activity is larger with a mean of 15.4% if 
the respondents live in mining areas and 13.1% for those who don’t. This could be part of the 
explanation for why the results are more conclusive with respect to demonstration activity 
than with voting. Nevertheless, I show that the resource constraint theory clearly does not 
cover the variation in voting and demonstration patterns that one would predict. Part of the 
explanation could be that the is dataset for example gives a correlation coefficient between 
working and often without cash as only -0.129, and of those who do have a job, 59% of them 
state that they are often without cash compared to a general mean of 67%. Being employed 
consequently doesn’t necessarily imply that one isn’t poor, even though your social network 
admittedly should still be larger than before. Local resource curse effects are nevertheless 
strong one of the main reasons why.  
5.1.7 Changing Cut-off Distances 
The main assumption in this thesis is nevertheless that mining activity creates economic 
multipliers that result in increased employment numbers, which again increases people’s 
opportunity and ability to participate in all kinds of political activity. This is facilitated 
through increased income and larger social networks. This basic assumption is widely 
confirmed, which means that all the necessary requirements for both individual and 
contextual factors to start to play out are present. I have set a cut-off distance at 50 kilometres 
for when the multiplier effects start to lose their momentum and the gains from seeking jobs 
in an active mining area no longer outweigh the costs. Changing this cut-off distance to 25 
and 50 and higher show that the economic multipliers are stronger or equally strong closer to 
the mines, but start to lose their significance further out. The coefficients in these cases 
become smaller, less significant or insignificant altogether, and the F-tests no longer hold.
4
   
 
                                                 
4
 See appendix, table A3- A8.  
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Besides creating jobs and economic multipliers I also hypothesize that mining activity leads 
to local resource curse effects. Changing the cut-off distance to lower and higher than 50 on 
these regressions gives much of the same results as in the baseline regressions. The size of the 
municipalities and local governments could explain the lack of variation in these results. If 
they are relatively large, everyone who lives inside the same borders will most likely 
experience the same degree of corruption, political intimidation and fairness of elections.  
5.1.8 Altering baseline regressions 
 It is clear that resource curse effects are highly present in mining areas and that these do have 
a partially negative effect on the political participation outcomes. The resource constraint 
theory however, does not seem to have an equally strong effect on the outcomes. It would 
therefore be interesting to see if, and how much, the results from the baseline regressions 
change if we remove these variables.
5
  
 
It is very much possible that the proxy variables that are included to test the resource 
constraint theory are bad control variables. This means that even though they do capture some 
omitted variable bias, they are also affected by the outcomes. These variables could in other 
words themselves be outcome variables when utilising the current empirical strategy (Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009, p: 64-68).  
 
When investigating how the outcomes change when removing the variables that proxy being 
poor (often without cash), having access to radio news and being member of a religious 
group, it turns out that neither the coefficients, F-tests or adjusted R
2 
change very much at all. 
This indicates that they are in fact bad variables that capture very little of the relevant 
variation. The only noticeable difference is that now both active50 and suspended50 
coefficients are significant at 10 % level. The estimated coefficients show that when a mine 
closes, demonstration activity decreases with 2,7 percentage points.   
 
Education however does seem to have a little more effect on the outcome. This is especially 
prevalent in the demonstrated and working regressions, which makes a lot of sense since they 
were strongly significant and relatively influential on the outcomes in question. This follows a 
lot of the pre-existing research on economic multipliers in mining areas in general and 
                                                 
5These results are on DiD-regressions only and can be found in the appendix, table A1-A2  
 
 political participation trends in SSA especially. High levels of education increases the effect 
of economic multipliers, in addition to increasing the level of inter-election participation 
(Moretti, 2010; Eggert, 2002; Morris et al., 2011; Kotsadam & Tolonen, 2013; Isaksson et al., 
2014; Isaksson 2010; Bratton, 2008).    
5.1.9 Alternative Definitions of Inter-election Activity 
A lot of these articles have employed different definitions of inter-election activity than 
demonstration attendance. It would therefore be interesting to test the validity of the above 
findings by investigating if the outcomes are similar when employing alternative proxies for 
inter-election participation. Going together with others to raise an issue or attending a 
community meeting are other good operationalisations. These variables still fulfil the 
requirements of my political participation definition as the individuals are actively seeking to 
influence political outcomes through public action. 
 
The results outlined in the first sections of this chapter indicate that there is very little 
correlation between election and inter-election activity. The coefficients from the regressions 
differ substantially, and we see a closer correlation between mining activity and 
demonstrations than with voting activity, which in the latter case is virtually non-existent. 
Even though one votes or participates in a demonstration, it therefore doesn’t necessarily 
mean that one participates in the other. The correlation coefficient between voting and 
demonstrating clearly shows this. With the other measures of inter-election participation 
however, the correlations are much stronger with only 3.5 % correlation between voting and 
demonstrating, whilst the corresponding numbers for raising an issue and attending a 
community meeting is 16 % and 19.4% respectively. 
 
Table 10: Correlation coefficients of political activity 
  
 Voted Demonstrated Raised issue Com. Meeting  
Voted 1,000    
Demonstrated 0.0346 1,000   
Raised issue 0.1602 0.2497 1,000  
Com. Meeting  0.1939 0.1693 0.5562 1,000 
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Table 11: DiD Regressions on Alternative Inter-Election Definitions 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES raised issue raised issue com. meeting com. meeting 
     
active50 -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.038*** -0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
inactive50 -0.040  0.009  
 (0.030)  (0.027)  
suspended50 
 
urban 
 
 
-0.084*** 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.090*** 
 
 
-0.117*** 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.123*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
age 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.080*** -0.080*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
education 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
local_corruption -0.003 -0.004 -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Careful what you say 0.005* 0.005** -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
elections_free 0.003 0.004* 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.340*** 0.379*** 0.440*** 0.498*** 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
     
Observations 34,699 36,592 34,763 36,664 
R-squared 0.084 0.085 0.123 0.124 
F test:  0.148 1.073 2.817 1.714 
p value 0.701 0.300 0.0933 0.190 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
 
 
Further investigating causal relationships between mining activity and attendance of 
community meetings and raising issues give very diverging results. In the original 
demonstration regressions, the resource curse variables had the opposite effect of those in the 
voting regressions, giving a positive effect on the outcome. The same effects were found 
when people lived in proximity of active mines whilst, inactive and suspended mines had a 
negative effect.  
 
 In comparison, the alternative definitions all have negative significant active50 variables, 
meaning that mining areas have less of both of these types of political activities. However, 
none of the F-tests show that there is a difference in behaviour between the treatment and 
control groups. Furthermore, the effects of the resource curse variables vary a great deal more 
than in the demonstration regressions. Whether elections are free and fair have a stronger 
impact on these outcomes than with demonstrations. In fact, less free and fair elections has a 
negative effect on attendance at community meetings, and to some degree on raising issues, 
especially in suspended mining areas. When people believe that they have to be careful what 
they say about politics, it’s more likely that people go together and raise an issue, but it has an 
insignificant negative effect on community meetings. With local corruption, attendance at 
community meetings is negatively affected, the results for raising an issue are similar, but 
insignificant.  
 
There are in other words few links between these types of more “traditional” political 
activities and demonstrations and protest marches. On the other hand, comparing them to 
voting outcomes is also difficult since the mining activity variables in the latter case are vastly 
insignificant. However, examining the effects of the local resource curse variables on the 
alternative definitions could make us understand their outcomes a little better. Attendance at 
community meetings have results that mainly follow those of voting, whilst with “raising an 
issue” it becomes difficult to compare since the outcomes in this case are mostly insignificant. 
The “careful what you say” variable could indicate that raising an issue follow patterns more 
along the lines of demonstration activity, but the signs of the other variables suggest 
otherwise.  
  
Reasons for why these outcomes differ so much from any of the other measurements of 
political activity could be many, and maybe there are some decisive factors that haven’t been 
controlled for. In addition, it could also be that the variables measure other topics besides 
political ones that are raised or discussed at meetings. It may be that at least some of these 
issues can be dealt with and solved amongst the participants without having to involve 
politicians. Whether these variables are then measures of political activity is consequently a 
question of definition. With the definition of political activity that I utilise, my opinion is that 
having participated in an election or in a demonstration is a better measure of political 
participation than attending community meetings or raising an issue with others.  
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It could also be that because of the resource curse issues a lot of these mining areas obviously 
deal with, people see demonstrations as a more potent way of voicing their discontent. 
Compared to other more conventional and “quiet” ways of making their opinions heard, such 
as attending community meetings, raising an issue or participating in elections, joining 
demonstrations and protests gets the message across in a clearer and more efficient manner. It 
could also be the result of a spurious connection where mining activity influences a third 
factor such as inequality which again leads to more demonstrations.      
5.1.10 Selection Biases and other Influencing Factors 
When employing an empirical strategy with a difference-in-differences method, it’s based on 
the assumption that the areas one compare would have similar developments if the treatment 
effect, in this case a mine opening, didn’t occur. Inactive mining areas should in other words 
have outcomes that follow similar patterns to those in areas outside of the economic reach of 
mining activity. However, a lot of my regressions with inactive variables have given 
significant results, and this indicates that they are in fact different from non-mining areas. I 
can point to two probable sources of why these deviations occur.  
 
The first is that the inactive variable captures pre-production stages where economic 
multipliers start to play out, prior to actual extraction, with the ensuing political 
consequences. Another possible explanation is that there is a selection bias. It entails that 
mining areas are different even before the industrial extraction stages have begun. These 
results confirm the findings of Eggert (2002), which state that even though the distribution of 
mineral resources is random, the discovery of them is not. Cost and access of labour, 
institutional quality and infrastructure are some of the factors that could be decisive. 
(Krugman, 1991; Isard et al., 1998). However, whether inactive areas are different from non-
mining areas or not is of little importance as I perform n F-test. This test either confirms or 
reject that active mining has an effect, and this is ultimately what we are interested in.  
 
Apart from these initial differences, it is also important to try and rule out any changes that 
might occur simultaneously as the treatment effect. If these are unaccounted for, they could 
erroneously give the difference estimation a bias. Although these unknown factors can be 
very hard to identify and control for, the following arguments are an attempt at addressing and 
possibly ruling out some or most of them.  
  
Although the dataset I’ve used doesn’t contain data on the factors I address, I use Kotsadam 
and Tolonens (2013) paper on mineral mining and female employment as a reference. This 
paper doesn’t address political participation and resource curse effects directly, but they do 
cover employment effects in mining areas. As economic multipliers and employment 
constitute the basic assumptions on which my hypotheses build upon, I propose that the 
results outlined below should at least be suggestive. The data that’s utilised in the paper is 
from the Demographic and Health Surveys and the same mining data that I have employed. 
Altogether, the data should be sufficiently comparable to be able to draw similar results on the 
basis of my findings as the ones that are described below.    
5.1.11 The Emergence of Mining Towns and Work Migration  
There is evidence that natural resource activity and mining booms attracts people who are 
looking for work (Lange, 2006; Corno and de Walque, 2012). Potentially, this could create a 
selection issue if these people have different attitudes towards political activity and 
perceptions of corruption, political intimidation and the definition of free and fair elections.  
Although the economic multipliers can also come about as a result of inward migration, it 
would be interesting to see if there are any differences in trends amongst the people who have 
never moved. Kotsadam and Tolonens (2013) paper show that the results for local inhabitants, 
who have lived near the mines all their lives, follow those of the baseline regressions and that 
this selection issue has little impact on the baseline results.    
5.1.12 Infrastructure 
Other time-varying factors that can be a source to possible erroneous conclusions is the 
building of new infrastructure. This is known to lead to higher local economic development 
and an increase in the effect of multipliers. If new infrastructure appears around active mines, 
this is usually a direct result of mining activity, but it can also be exogenous. Even though the 
sample size in their alternative regressions is significantly reduced, Kotsadam and Tolonen 
(2013) show that proximity to roads has little effect on the outcome, They find that there is no 
difference in the employment effects in areas with large roads compared to small roads and so 
this evidence suggests that infrastructure is not driving the results.  
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5.1.13 World prices and Mining Intensity 
The same paper also investigates the effect of world prices and mining intensity on 
respondents’ employment statuses. More active mines in relative closeness to the individual’s 
place of living should theoretically result in stronger economic multipliers. By including a 
measure of mining intensity, they find that this does indeed increase the likelihood of 
respondents being employed. Higher world prices on the mineral that’s extracted in the 
respondents’ local mines also seems to have a positive effect on employment. 
. 
 
  
 6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate how local mining activity influences welfare, 
and political participation rates in SSA. Traditional participation theory predicts that when 
people get a job and a steady income the relative cost of voting declines as they are in a better 
financial situation and have larger networks. The network effects can be especially important 
as workers who meet people in similar situations often motivate and teach each other about 
political topics and how to go about when they want to participate. They can help each other 
formulate opinions and take a stand on issues that influences their everyday lives. 
 
Unfortunately, research also shows that poorer people vote and participate much less than 
their richer co-citizens. Issues that are brought to the agenda, discussed and past in national 
and regional assemblies also have a tendency to favour the rich rather than the poor. This 
could potentially create a vicious cycle where economic and political inequality reinforces 
each other. 
 
However, the research that exists on political participation rates in Africa gives very different 
results from those that have been found in western countries. If anything, those with less 
resources participate more. Those who have attempted to explain these results point to 
traditional clientelist schemes and that those who have more money and connections prefer to 
find other channels through which they can influence political outcomes such as bribery and 
nepotism. 
 
I wanted to examine other possible determinants of political participation in the SSA and take 
a closer look at how resource abundance and civil liberties could influence outcomes. My 
thesis builds upon a difference-in- differences strategy on two waves of  Afrobarometer 
survey data combined with the Raw Material Dataset’s GPS-coordinates of past, present and 
future mines in the SSA. This data allowed me to see how employment rates, political 
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participation and perceptiveness of corruption, free and fairness of elections and political 
intimidation changes when mines open or close.   
 
My results mainly support earlier research on this topic, but I also find that local resource 
curse effects can be a decisive factor.  The resource curse is commonly known as the impact 
natural resource abundance has on countries or regions with initially low institutional quality. 
Without adequate checks and balances the governments are consequently increasingly prone 
to rent-seeking, corruption, growth in inequality and political engineering towards less 
democratic regimes.  
 
To make natural resource abundance into a blessing rather than a curse the literature at hand 
emphasizes that the population as a whole needs to be able to reap the benefits from these 
resources. Making sure that the owners of the resources and the government work together to 
invest in infrastructure, skills-training and linkage development is in this respect paramount. 
Building up institutions that can manage the macroeconomic challenges that come with the 
vast amount of revenues that these resources can produce is also of utmost importance. 
 
Although many countries in SSA has experienced vast economic growth and in many cases 
managed to build up a middle class, my results indicate that strategies for linkage 
development (if they at all exist), have to a large degree failed in satisfying local populations. 
Instead mining activity results in a high prevalence of resource curse effects that has a 
substantial negative effect on political participation outcomes. 
 
In essence, I find that although mining activity leads to higher employment this doesn’t 
necessarily result in higher political participation rates or living standards. Despite the fact 
that people are employed they still often go without cash, and even if increased employment 
did have a positive effect on participation rates, they are effectively offset by factors related to 
the resource curse. The results on voting are highly indecisive, and the same goes for more 
traditional forms of inter-election activity such as raising an issue or attending community 
meetings. There is however a positive impact on demonstration activity, and it is very 
interesting to see that resource curse effects in this case has a positive effect on attendance. In 
the other measures of participation it is rather the other way around.   
    
 It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that general participation rates are quite high, 
especially in national elections. When taking into account that I had somewhat limited time 
and access to different types of data and variables, it could be interesting to extend my 
regressions and analysis. How much countries’ democratic past influences outcomes is one 
factor. Other variables that could give more insight into determinants of political 
participation, the prevalence of local resource curse effects and the connection between these 
two, could be regional fixed effects, institutional quality and levels of economic development 
and inequality, both on a regional and national level.     
 
There are in other words plenty of topics related to welfare effects of local resource 
abundance that require further research.  Topics such as prevalence of CSR and local linkage 
programs could be one interesting direction to take. A closer investigation into how windfalls 
are distributed between local and central government could also give interesting insights into 
how to ensure the best possible management of natural resources. For example, how does this 
distribution influence local and national economic growth and inequality rates?  What sectors 
are positively influenced, and could the increased local employment rates be wholly or partly 
explained by larger governments and bureaucracies rather than local economic growth?  
 
With respect to political participation rates in SSA more in depth research is needed both with 
respect to individual and contextual determinants. A closer investigation into clientilist 
schemes and ties between governments and richer, more influential citizens could give some 
indications. Now that many countries in SSA have a growing middle class it will be 
interesting to see how this affects political processes, agendas and outcomes. Future research 
will give indications of  in what direction democracies in SSA are developing.  
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8 Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Alternative DiD-regression on Employment Status and Political Participation 
  
 (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES working working voted voted demonstrated demonstrated 
       
active50 0.022*** 0.024*** -0.003 -0.000 0.014** 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
inactive50 -0.051**  -0.003  -0.023  
 (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.022)  
suspended50 
 
urban 
 
 
0.051*** 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
0.050*** 
 
 
-0.037*** 
0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.041*** 
 
 
0.003 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
age 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
education 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
local_corruption   -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
careful   -0.004** -0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
elections_free   0.007*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.583*** -0.423*** 0.001 0.091*** 0.109*** 0.149*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) 
       
Observations 45,072 47,427 34,803 36,684 34,134 36,019 
R-squared 0.169 0.169 0.158 0.159 0.032 0.033 
F test:  9.575 7.477 5.08e-05 1.217 2.692 7.400 
p value 0.00197 0.00625 0.994 0.270 0.101 0.00652 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
 
  
Table A2: Alternative DiD-regression on Resource Curse Effects 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES corruption corruption elections  elections careful  careful 
       
active50 0.048*** 0.046*** -0.073*** -0.065*** 0.039** 0.034** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
inactive50 -0.149***  -0.230***  -0.227***  
 (0.049)  (0.060)  (0.058)  
suspended50 
 
urban 
 
 
0.077*** 
-0.049** 
(0.021) 
0.081*** 
 
 
-0.016 
0.091*** 
(0.026) 
-0.020* 
 
 
-0.023* 
-0.055** 
(0.026) 
-0.022** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
age 0.003* 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.004*** -0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
female -0.017* -0.018** -0.001 -0.006 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
education 0.023*** 0.023*** -0.008** -0.009*** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 1.509*** 1.202*** 1.320*** 1.509*** 2.406*** 2.159*** 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059) 
       
Observations 38,035 40,080 41,547 43,748 43,187 45,478 
R-squared 0.108 0.105 0.228 0.228 0.082 0.084 
F test:  15.95 17.47 6.748 30.30 20.45 10.00 
p value 6.53e-05 2.92e-05 0.00939 3.73e-08 6.13e-06 0.00157 
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Table A.3: DiD- regressions on employment rates with cut-off distance 30 km 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES working working 
   
active25 0.014 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
inactive25 -0.123*** -0.036*** 
 (0.041) (0.013) 
suspended25 
 
urban 
 
 
0.051*** 
 
 
0.051*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
age 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.102*** -0.101*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
education 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.479*** -0.466*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
   
Observations 46,109 47,427 
R-squared 0.170 0.169 
F test: active25-inactive25=0 10.95 11.15 
p value 0.000939 0.000842 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table A.4: DiD- regressions on demonstration and voting activity, cut-off distance 25 km 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES voted voted demonstrated demonstrated 
     
active25 0.003 0.003 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
inactive25 0.002  -0.015  
 (0.045)  (0.040)  
suspended25 
 
urban 
 
 
-0.041*** 
0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.042*** 
 
 
0.002 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
age 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
education 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
local_corruption -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
careful -0.004** -0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
elections_free 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.092*** 0.051** 0.056** 0.151*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) 
     
Observations 35,591 36,684 34,934 36,019 
R-squared 0.158 0.159 0.032 0.033 
F test: 0.000327 0.385 0.858 6.898 
p value 0.986 0.535 0.354 0.00863 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
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Table A.5: DiD- regressions on resource curse effects with cut-off distance 25 km 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES corruption corruption elections elections careful  careful  
       
active25 0.058*** 0.057*** -0.125*** -0.120*** 0.040* 0.039* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
inactive25 -0.233***  -0.304***  -0.415***  
 (0.085)  (0.106)  (0.102)  
suspended25 
 
urban 
 
 
0.081*** 
-0.045* 
(0.026) 
0.081*** 
 
 
-0.016 
0.042 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
 
 
-0.021* 
-0.096*** 
(0.032) 
-0.021* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
age 0.002* 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.004*** -0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
female -0.017** -0.018** -0.005 -0.006 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
education 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
       
Constant 1.198*** 1.139*** 1.680*** 1.692*** 2.391*** 2.428*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) 
       
Observations 38,912 40,080 42,511 43,748 44,193 45,478 
R-squared 0.107 0.105 0.227 0.228 0.082 0.084 
F test:  11.12 11.18 2.768 18.15 19.33 12.93 
p value 0.000854 0.000827 0.0962 2.05e-05 1.10e-05 0.000323 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
  
 Table A.6: DiD- regressions on employment rates with cut-off distance 100 km 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES working working 
   
active100 0.006 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
inactive100 -0.063***  
 (0.020)  
suspended100 
 
urban 
 
 
0.055*** 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.051*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
age 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
education 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.428*** -0.429*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) 
   
Observations 43,267 47,427 
R-squared 0.171 0.169 
F test: 11.97 0.0451 
p value 0.000540 0.832 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
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Table A.7: DiD- regressions on demonstration and voting activity, cut-off distance 100 km 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES voted voted demonstrated demonstrated 
     
active100 -0.006 -0.004 0.005 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
inactive100 0.008  -0.016  
 (0.023)  (0.020)  
suspended100 
 
urban 
 
 
-0.038*** 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.041*** 
 
 
0.001 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
age 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age2 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
female -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.047*** -0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
education 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
local_corruption -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
careful -0.005** -0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
elections_free 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.050* 0.159*** 
 (0.030) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021) 
     
Observations 33,153 36,684 32,543 36,019 
R-squared 0.159 0.159 0.033 0.033 
F test 0.432 3.069 1.101 7.178 
p value 0.511 0.0798 0.294 0.00738 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country fixed effects have also been included in the 
regression, but the results aren’t displayed 
  
 Table A.8: DiD- regressions on resource curse effects with cut-off distance 100 km 
 
 (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) (inactive) (suspended) 
VARIABLES corruption corruption elections elections careful careful 
       
active100 0.072*** 0.059*** -0.078*** -0.057*** 0.045*** 0.033** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
inactive100 -0.102**  -0.287***  -0.137***  
 (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.050)  
suspended100 
 
urban 
 
 
0.077*** 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
0.081*** 
 
 
-0.013 
0.120*** 
(0.021) 
-0.021* 
 
 
-0.013 
-0.098*** 
(0.021) 
-0.022* 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
age 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
age2 -0.004** -0.004** 0.004* 0.003 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
female -0.019** -0.018** -0.011 -0.006 0.034*** 0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
education 0.023*** 0.023*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.000 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 1.066*** 1.454*** 1.913*** 1.453*** 2.201*** 2.214*** 
 (0.061) (0.046) (0.064) (0.061) (0.075) (0.061) 
       
Observations 36,294 40,080 39,824 43,748 41,413 45,478 
R-squared 0.109 0.105 0.227 0.229 0.086 0.085 
F test: 16.07 16.57 17.29 68.79 13.76 38.43 
p value 6.12e-05 4.69e-05 3.21e-05 0 0.000208 5.73e-10 
 
